In another way, however, it does not: the human experiences and fulfillments of rich and poor are fundamentally the same. This is an important part of the case for thinking that their welfare grounds requirements of beneficence on us to help them. But Part II shows that it is also part of the case for limiting those requirements.
Drawing attention to the range of goods that ground requirements on us to help each other, Cullity argues that these requirements only make sense on the assumption that a life of a certain kind -- a life that is not restricted in an extremely demanding way -- is one that it is not wrong for us to live.
The Life-Saving Analogy 2. An Argument from Beneficence 3. Objections to Aid 4. Saving Lives 5. The Extreme Demand 6.
Problems of Demandingness 7. Impartiality, Fairness, and Beneficence 8. The Rejection of the Extreme Demand 9. Permission Requirement An advanced undergraduate with an ethics background Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
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Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online - view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. An original treatment of one of moral philosophy's central questions Tackles key ethical and political complexities.
Also of Interest. Garrett Cullity University of Adelaide. How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? On any credible moral outlook, other people's pressing need for assistance can ground moral requirements on us to help themrequirements of beneficence.
How far do those requirements extend? One way to think about this is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between joining in efforts to help people at a distance and rescuing a needy person yourself, directly.
The Moral Demands of Affluence
Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this analogy. In some ways, the analogy is not only simple, but politically and metaphysically simplistic. However, it contains an important truth: we are morally required to help other people, indirectly as well as directly. But the number of needy people in the world is enormous, and their need is very great.
Once we start to recognize requirements to help them, when is it morally acceptable to stop? Cullity answers this question in Part II. Examining the nature of beneficence, he argues that its requirements only make sense on the assumption that many of the interests we share in common-rich and poor alike-are interests it is not wrong to pursue.
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